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Introduction

1
In November 2009 Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia agreed to establish a customs union with harmonized import tariffs. The new common tariff became effective on 1 January 2010, and internal border controls have been subsequently removed.
The main objective of the customs union is to foster economic integration between the three countries. Further steps of integration foresee moves toward free movement of goods, capital and labour. At the same time, as the common tariff was worked out in the crisis environment of 2009, it was also used in part as a tool of industrial policy-to promote import substitution in certain areas through increase in tariffs, for example in the case of the automotive sector.
2
The introduction of the common tariff resulted in changes to import tariff structure in each country, predominantly upwards, although a large number of tariffs were also adjusted downwards. The Kazakhstan's schedule underwent most significant changes, which affected more than half of the tariff lines. This paper looks at the effect of a comprehensive tariff schedule change in Kazakhstan on the structure and volume of imports. It argues that the change in tariff schedule can be seen as largely exogenous and thus provides a unique opportunity to study trade diversion effects across a broad range of merchandize groups.
A number of studies modelled the effects of the customs union on the economy of Kazakhstan (for instance, Vinhas de Souza (2011 ), World Bank, 2011 . Empirical evidence has been so far based largely on a rapid growth of trade within the customs union in 2010.
However, this rapid growth came after an even sharper collapse in trade with Russia and Belarus in 2009 (a much sharper drop than in the case of imports from outside the customs union). It may thus to a large extend reflect post-crisis recovery trends not directly related to policy changes, as trade collapses during crises are known to overshoot by far the contraction of demand leading to subsequent brisk recoveries (Baldwin, 2009 ) and, moreover, as trade intermediate goods tends to be affected more than trade in final goods some trade partnerships may be affected much more than others. This paper is an early attempt to provide a more nuanced empirical assessment of the impact of the common external tariff of the customs union on Kazakh imports. In particular, the paper looks at how imports of various goods from various trade partners were affected depending on the direction and magnitude of change in the corresponding tariff.
The results suggest that while the change in tariffs had no significant effect on overall (worldwide) imports, it appears to have created some trade diversion, with a significantly negative impact on imports from China in particular and a significantly positive impact on imports from within the customs union. The magnitude of the latter effect is, however, fairly small, and there is little evidence of trade diversion from higher-value-added exporters (in the EU countries) to customs union members. While one needs to be mindful that these are only short-run effects, subject to many caveats, they nonetheless suggest that benefits of the new tariff policy to Kazakhstan (and likely other members of the union) have been limited, if at all present. Larger benefits could come from liberalization of services sectors and market access within the union.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II outlines customs union arrangements and discusses the impact of introduction of the common tariff on trade flows. Section III presents empirical results for Kazakh imports. Concluding remarks follow.
Kazakhstan's entry into the Customs Union
Customs union arrangements
In November 2009 Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia agreed to establish a customs union. By 1 January 2010 import tariffs of the three countries were harmonized into a common tariff.
While for Russia relatively few tariff lines changed, in Kazakhstan approximately 60 per cent of items were affected (in most cases tariffs increased).
In July 2010 the three countries ratified a customs code and other documents forming the regulatory base of the union (which started harmonizing not only tariffs but also procedures and non-tariff regulations). Internal border controls have been removed. The import tariff revenues have been pooled and they accrue to national budgets in predetermined proportions (with Russia entitled to around 88 per cent of all revenues; Belarus to 5 per cent and Kazakhstan to 7 per cent). These proportions are subject to regular reviews.
The Customs Union established a supranational body, the Customs Union Commission, with initially around 150 staff. Decisions of the Commission are taken by a qualified majority of 2/3 where Russia holds 57 per cent of the votes and Belarus and Kazakhstan hold 21.5 per cent each.
The sides also agreed that the common import tariff will be adjusted over time to reflect Russia's WTO commitments (Russia's accession was approved in December 2011 after 18 years of negotiations). It was also agreed that the common tariff will also serve as a goods schedule for a potential WTO accession of Belarus and Kazakhstan, although the two countries will still need to negotiate their own schedules for services and non-tariff measures. 
Common external tariff
When the three countries agreed to harmonize their import duties, they generally took Russia's prevailing tariffs as a base (Russian tariffs were adopted for over 80 per cent of classification lines). Belarus and Russia had in many cases identical tariffs prior to unification, and Belarus has been further able to negotiate higher import duties on trucks, electrical engines and equipment and a number of other key Belarusian export products. As a result, around three quarters of tariff lines remained unaffected in Belarus. 4 By contrast, Kazakhstan ran a relatively more liberal trade policy prior to unification of tariffs.
The changes brought about by the introduction of the common tariff were largely exogenous (in the sense that they were not primarily derived from Kazakhstan's own import substitution agenda) and affected the majority of tariff lines: tariff increased in around 45 per cent of cases and decreased in around 10 per cent of cases (Vinhas de Souza, 2011 ).
This makes the study of the impact of tariff changes on Kazakhstan's imports particularly interesting. Firstly, transition to common economic tariff resulted in a revision of more than half of tariff lines resulting in a large variation in simultaneous changes in tariffs. Secondly, these changes did not result primarily from negotiations with the key trading partners (as would be the case with WTO accession, for example), nor from domestically-driven industrial policy. While joining the Customs Union was an explicit policy choice, the exact changes in most tariff lines were largely driven by Russia's existing tariff structure, and to a lesser extent tariff increases in Russia following the 2008-09 crisis and interests of Belarusian industry.
In some cases tariff increases were seen as sensitive for consumers or the industry, as in the case of passenger cars or pharmaceuticals imports. For these goods (over 80 groups in total) transition arrangements were introduced, which are expected to be phased out over several years. 4 For an overview of issues related to Belarus's accession to the union see Tochitskaya (2010) .
Effects of customs union
Economic unions generally generate two effects: trade creation and trade diversion (see, for instance, Venables (2003) for a discussion). The term trade diversion coined by Viner (1950) refers to the fact that a relative change in tariff barriers diverts trade from the more efficient exporters to less efficient ones.
In the case of customs union there are two groups of potential beneficiaries of trade diversion: customs union members (Russia and Belarus) and countries, which retained zero or reduced tariffs under various regional trade agreements (primarily countries of the Commonwealth of Independence States (CIS) and Serbia). For instance, in cases where introduction of a common tariff resulted in a relative increase in the tariff for Chinese goods compared with a tariff for Russian or CIS goods, one would expect an increase in imports from Russia or CIS and a decrease in exports from China. Trade diversion is generally welfare reducing, as consumers are forced to buy goods from less efficient producers.
Trade creation arises due to lowering of trade barriers within the union, and is generally welfare enhancing as consumers are given opportunity to buy from more efficient foreign producers, if any. In the case of customs union some trade creation might arise due to elimination of administrative barriers (as custom checks are removed from internal borders) and expanded market access. As imports from CIS countries were typically subject to zero duties, trade creation is not expected to arise from the change in duties per se. In fact, some "trade destruction" could arise in cases where external tariffs were increased for items where trade cannot be diverted to exporters covered by regional trade agreements, at least in the short term.
Overall, one would expect to observe some trade diversion from the rest of the world to CIS and customs union countries, while trade creation within the union is expected to be unrelated to change in tariffs. These patterns suggest that the potential for trade diversion is perhaps highest away from the Chinese goods and towards customs union members, although it may in practice be muted if Chinese producers enjoy a significant cost advantage (Rozhkov, 2011) . Despite existing free-trade agreements, scope for trade diversion towards CIS countries outside the customs union appears to be currently limited.
External trade of Kazakhstan
Results
Data
The The tariffs applied by Kazakhstan before and after joining the customs union are taken from the official publication in Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, the national newspaper, and the official website of the Customs Union Commission, respectively. The statutory tariffs are specified at the HS ten-digit level for items such as, for instance, bottles for sterilization of more than 0.55 litres in volume for use in the pharmaceuticals industry. In most cases all ten-digit tariffs with the same six-digit group coincide but certain six-digit lines (including the example above) contain multiple rates of ten-digit tariffs.
The analysis below first focuses on a core group of line items with unambiguous tariffs at the six-digit level, i.e. containing uniform tariff at the ten-digit level before and after the change of tariff schedule (this assumption is subsequently relaxed). To minimize the "noise effect" from numerous lines with very low and volatile import values, the analysis further focuses on industry-country pairs, for which annual import volumes exceed US$ 1 million (by volume this eliminates only around 2.5 per cent of the total imports, and up to 11 per cent for individual trade partners).
Tariff lines where transitory arrangements applied are also excluded from the core sample. While preliminary trade data are complete for most trading partners, including China, EU and non-customs-union CIS countries, the 2010 six-digit breakdown is incomplete for trade inside the customs union. Thus the corresponding estimates need to be viewed as tentative.
It appears that the data are underreported for the later months of the year, in other words, differences in coverage do not seem to be related to the industry structure.
Empirical approach
The following specifications are estimated for changes in logarithm of imports from Kazakhstan's major trade partners between 2009 (before the customs union) and 2010
(after the introduction of the common external tariff):
∆IM j,t = αIM j,t-1 + β∆d j,t + λZ j,t + ε j,t
where IMj,t is the change in imports for six-digit line j between 2009 and 2010; IMj,t-1 is the logarithm of imports in 2009; ∆d is the change in tariff, and Z are a number of controls.
These include changes in imports from the same trading partner over previous years (2006-08 and 2008-09) ; change in imports from all origins over the same periods; and dummy variables for groups of goods at the three-digit level of HS. Regressions were estimated by OLS.
As discussed above, the key groups of trading partners are customs union countries (Belarus and Russia), EU countries, China, CIS countries outside the union, and the rest of the world. In the case of customs union countries additional specifications also control for concurrent exports of Russia and Belarus to the rest of the world (countries outside the customs union) -to account for changes in export capabilities in these countries. 
Results
Basic estimation results are summarized in Table 2 . Column (1) presents the results for changes in the overall volume of imports. The coefficient on the change in tariffs is positive but highly statistically insignificant. Taken at face value, it implies that a 10 per cent increase in tariff (which is more than the average increase in the sample plus one standard deviation) led to a 2.7 per cent increase in import volume. Columns (2) to (6) The last column adds exports from Belarus and Russia to all countries outside the customs union as an additional control in the customs union regression. This sharply reduces the size of the sample, which now only includes goods that Russia and Belarus export elsewhere. As a result, the magnitude of the coefficient on the tariff increase is halved, while the coefficient on customs union exports to the rest of the world is indeed positive, suggesting that at least for some goods a non-negligible part of the increase in Russian and Belarusian exports to Kazakhstan is explained by increased global export capabilities of these countries in the respective goods. Table 3 presents results for the case when six-digit lines with non-uniform tariffs (at the tendigit levels) are included. The change in tariff in these cases is authors' approximation, which may be imprecise (the actual effective tariff would also depend on the import mix within six-digit categories, which changes over time). On the other hand, fine granularity of tariffs within six-digit groups often indicates that these goods are sensitive and / or important in terms of volumes.
The overall picture remains broadly unchanged. The main difference is that the coefficient on tariff change for China is higher and statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. It implies that a two percentage point increase in tariff led on average to a 2.8 per cent contraction in imports of respective goods from China. The coefficients for the world as a whole, the customs union, the EU and the rest of the world are broadly unchanged, while the CIS coefficient turns positive although it is very close to zero. As discussed above, this is consistent with the impact of tariff increases on CIS countries being a priori somewhat ambiguous. While in most cases tariffs for non-CIS countries have been increased, which is expected to lead to trade diversion and / or "trade destruction", in some cases tariffs were reduced. This could on the contrary lead to trade creation or trade diversion in favour of non-CIS imports.
To check for any asymmetric responses to increases and decreases in tariffs, equation (1) was extended to include interactions between the change in tariffs and dummy variables for non-negative (POS) and non-positive (NEG) changes in tariffs, respectively.
∆IM j,t = αIM j,t-1 + β 1 ∆d j,t *POS j + β 2 ∆d j,t *NEG j + λZ j,t + ε j,t
The results, summarized in Table 4 , provide no evidence of trade creation in response to reductions in tariffs and suggest that the earlier results were driven mainly by decreases in trade with China and increases in intra-union trade in response to increases in tariffs. This may partly reflect the lower number of observations and smaller dispersion in case of decreases in tariffs (and hence higher standard errors in that subsample). In addition, in the specification allowing for asymmetric responses the coefficient on tariff increases with respect to the rest of the world becomes slightly larger and statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. 
Discussion
The analysis suggests some trade diversion effect due to higher tariffs. Imports from China saw a more significant decrease in response to higher tariffs. Imports from Russia and Belarus increased, although the increase was relatively small. Imports from the EU, CIS and the rest of the world were largely unaffected. The association between changes in overall imports and changes in tariff structure appears to have been insignificant, both in statistical and in economic terms.
It should be noted that these conclusions only relate to trade creation and trade diversion in response to changes in tariffs, as the identification strategy relied on differential response of imports that faced higher tariffs and imports that faced lower tariffs. It is possible that changes in non-tariff barriers, in particular their reduction within the customs union, resulted in higher trade creation and perhaps higher trade diversion. Such effects may take place across the board regardless of the corresponding tariffs and changes in them.
The importance of non-tariff barriers may also help to explain the results obtained for the CIS countries. Unlike members of the union, CIS countries do not appear to have benefited from trade diversion, despite the fact that they typically enjoy duty-free regimes under various bilateral treaties. This may in part reflect the structure of imports from CIS discussed above -namely the fact that CIS countries trade less with Kazakhstan and may have fewer industries capable of substituting exports of other trading partners.
It may also reflect the existence of substantial non-tariff barriers to imports from outside the union, while trade inside the union benefited from relaxation of some non-tariff barriers. 
Conclusion
This paper looked at the early impact of a change in import tariffs of Kazakhstan upon creation of the customs union on Kazakhstan's imports. The case of Kazakhstan is particularly interesting, as the country effectively adopted the tariff schedule based on the prevailing tariffs of Belarus and Russia (with additional amendments reflecting industrial policy interests of the latter countries). As a result, changes were simultaneous, largely exogenous, and affected over half of all tariff lines.
The preliminary empirical results suggest little overall effect on aggregate imports and some trade diversion as a result of a sweeping change in the tariff schedule. While overall imports for a particular product line appear to be broadly unaffected by the changes in tariffs, an increase in tariff has a statistically significantly negative impact on imports from China and a significantly positive impact on imports from within the customs union. The economic magnitude of this effect is relatively moderate, however. Further, there is little evidence that the effect extends to exporters with a higher share of higher-value-added goods in their product mix, such as the EU countries.
The estimates in the paper can only capture the average short-run effects, only those related to tariff changes per se, and are subject to many other caveats and data limitations. They nonetheless suggest that benefits of the new tariff policy to Kazakhstan and members of the union selling to Kazakhstan are limited; the increases in tariffs mainly led to a substantially higher tax burden on consumers and producers using imported intermediate goods but had a limited impact on their behaviour.
In this sense, the findings are consistent with the view that the value of modern trade agreements derives primarily from investment and service liberalisation rather than changes in rules governing movement of goods (Baldwin, 2011; Schiff and Winters, 2003) . Within the customs union, larger benefits could come over time from liberalization of services sectors and improved market access within the union.
The paper also provides some tentative evidence that improved market access (including physical removal of customs from internal borders) matters -in the sense that, unlike members of the union, CIS countries do not appear to have benefited from trade diversion, despite the fact that they typically enjoy duty-free regimes under various bilateral treaties (This may also in part reflect the fact that they trade less with Kazakhstan and may have fewer industries capable of substituting exports of other trading partners, as well as the existence of substantial non-tariff barriers to imports from outside the union).
Further, a number of simulations suggest that gains from further liberalisation within the customs union could be substantial (World Bank, 2011) . Importantly, service sector liberalisation would benefit other members of the union as well (see, for instance, Jensen, Rutherford, and Tarr (2007) and Tarr and Volchkova (2010) on Russia).
Currently, there are plans for gradual deepening of economic integration within the framework of the Common Economic Area of the Eurasian Economic Community, which could help to reap the benefits of lower non-tariff barriers and liberalisation in the service sectors.
